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Abstract
This paper uses a Bayesian mechanism design approach to investigate the effect communication
in a threshold public goods game, where individuals have private information about contribution
costs. If at least some fraction of the group make a discrete contribution, a public benefit accrues to
all members of the group. We experimentally implement three different communication structures
prior to the decision move: (a) simultaneous exchange of binary messages, (b) larger finite numerical
message space and (c) unrestricted text chat. We obtain theoretical bounds on the efficiency gains
that are obtainable under these different communication structures. In an experiment with three
person groups and a threshold of two, we observe significant efficiency gains only with the richest of
these communication structures, where participants engage in unrestricted text chatting. In that
case, the efficiency bounds implied by mechanism design theory are not only achieved, but with
experience are actually surpassed.
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1 Introduction
We investigate how communication influences public good provision in a threshold public goods game
with private information about contribution costs. The provision of threshold public goods combines
free riding incentives with a coordination problem, both of which are further complicated if there is
private information. Pre-play communication between agents provides a potential path to overcoming
these problems, but the how effective such communication by itself can be, and how its effectiveness
may depend on the structure of communication and private information, are questions that remain
largely unanswered both theoretically or empirically. This paper makes three contributions to address-
ing these questions. First, by modeling the game with communication as a Bayesian mechanism design
problem, we are able develop some theoretical bounds on the gains that can be attained from different
pre-play communication protocols. Second, we show how these bounds depend on the distribution of
private information and on the communication structure - in particular the richness of the message
space. Third, we design and conduct an experiment where we vary both the communication structure
and the distribution of private information.
There are several results from this study. First, in the experiment we find that communication has
significant beneficial effects only when the group members communicate in natural language, which is
very rich. Restricting subjects to coarser message spaces, such as a binary message space or to one-
time reports of their private information partially solves the coordination problem, but not enough
to produce a statistically significant improvement compared with groups that were not allowed to
communicate. A second finding is that the effectiveness of pre-play communication depends on the
distribution of private information. In half of our data, it was common knowledge that all subjects
had contribution costs that were less than or equal to the benefit of the public good, implying that
it was common knowledge that, for every subject, it is optimal to contribute if their contribution
is pivotal for the provision of the public good. In the other half of the data, the distribution of
contribution costs was such that its support included costs that exceeded the benefit, and hence it
was was common knowledge that any group member with such a high cost has a dominant strategy to
free ride. In this second variant, natural language communication was much less effective and helped
only after significant experience was gained. This sharp difference in the effect of communication
is also reflected in the theoretical bounds implied by the optimal mechanism. A binding individual
rationality constraint, which is present only in the high cost treatment, sharply reduces amount of
public good provision that can be supported. Thus, we establish both theoretically and behaviorally,
that the effectiveness of private communication depends on both the richness of the message space
and the distribution of private information.
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To keep the analysis and experimental design simple, players in the threshold public goods game
have only a binary choice - to contribute or not, and the public good is produced if and only if
at least some threshold number of group members choose to contribute, with the threshold being
less than the group size. This class of games includes the social dilemmas studied by Dawes et
al. (1986), Offerman et al. (1998), and Palfrey and Rosenthal (1991), and shares similar strategic
elements to the volunteer’s dilemma, entry games, and participation games studied by Goeree and
Holt (2005). Contributions are non-refundable, so that an efficient outcome requires that exactly the
threshold number of contributions are made. Too many contributions or too few contributions reflect
coordination failure. Because the group members have different contribution costs, (ex ante) efficient
provision also requires that the contributions are made only by the lowest cost members of the group.
Thus heterogeneity of contribution costs create a second kind of coordination problem, and private
information exacerbates this latter coordination problem with an incentive compatibility problem. In
all cases there is a free rider problem, in the sense that any contributing member would prefer to
switch roles with any non-contributing member, regardless of their contribution costs.
The three forms of preplay communication we consider were carefully chosen. The coarsest
possible message space we consider is binary.1 In the communication stage with binary messages,
each group member announces an ”intention” to either contribute or not, which is then followed by
a simultaneous-move contribution stage with binding decisions, so the communication stage can be
viewed as a direct signal about contribution in the final stage of the game or alternatively as a ”practice
game”, where one’s first round contribution decision has no direct payoff consequences. The second
message space is somewhat richer, where group members simultaneously each announce any number in
the support of the distribution of contribution costs, thus mimicking a direct mechanism (but without
a mediator), which is then followed by a contribution stage with binding decisions. The richest
communication structure we consider is natural language communication where the communication
stage consists of a fixed time period during which English language chat messages can be broadcast
in continuous time among the group members. After the chat stage, binding contribution decisions
are made simultaneously by all group members.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. The related literature is reviewed in Section 2.
Section 3 specifies the experimental design, theoretical framework and the central hypotheses. Section
4 presents the experimental results and analysis. The last section concludes.
1A binary message space was also explored in past work (Palfrey and Rosenthal 1993).
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2 Related Literature
Theory
That selfish players may choose to reveal private information through costless and non-binding com-
munication or cheap talk, and that such revelation can lead to efficiency gains, has been shown by
Crawford and Sobel (1982), and the problem has been formulated in generality by Forges (1986) and
Myerson (1986). Palfrey and Rosenthal (1991) were the first to investigate the effects of cheap talk in
a model where players have private information about costs to contribute towards the provision of a
public good. They considered a ‘threshold public good game’ where provision requires contributions
from at least a minimum number of people. Using a binary communication setting, they showed that
perfect coordination is not Bayesian-incentive compatible and that players have weak incentives to
free-ride in these kind of situations, but they show the existence of communication equilibria that lead
to higher efficiency. Using a model of continuous contributions with two privately informed players,
Agastya et al. (2007) show theoretically that individuals do not have an incentive to contribute to the
public good without communication, but binary communication gives them incentives to provide the
good with positive probability.
Kawamura (2011) uses an n-player setting and shows that there always exists an equilibrium
where binary messages are credible and that, when n goes to infinity, the equilibrium with binary
communication is the most efficient one. Costa and Moreira (2012) find that a truthful equilibrium of
the communication game with a binary message space cannot be Pareto dominated by any truthful
equilibrium with any finite message space. They argue that this is because players use a threshold
rule to make contribution decisions and in any situation with more than one contribution threshold,
they have incentives to understate their types and thereby free-ride on their partners’ investment.
I DON’T THINK THIS IS RELEVANT: Other interesting theoretical works in the area of
strategic information transmission include political bargaining (Matthews (1989)), bilateral exchange
(Matthews and Postlewaite (1989)), legislative rules (Gilligan and Krehbiel (1987)), externalities as-
sociated with technological adoption and standardization (Farrell (1993), Farrell and Saloner (1988)),
agendas and straw votes (Ordeshook and Palfrey (1988)), bargaining (Farrell and Gibbons (1989)),
and applications to job markets (Forges (1990)), arms races (Baliga and Sjostrom (2004)) and interim
efficient allocation rules in two-type environment with risk-neutral quasi-linear preferences and fixed
size projects (Ledyard and Palfrey (1994)) as well as in independent linear environments (Ledyard
and Palfrey (2007)).
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Experiments
Threshold public goods games have been implemented in the laboratory by few researchers. Bagnoli
and McKee (1991) find that the Pareto efficient outcome emerges when the cost of the good, the payoffs
to those in the group, and the initial wealth positions of those in the group are common knowledge.
They report that if the collective valuation of a group exceeds the cost of the good, the members
of the group voluntarily contribute exactly the cost of the public good. Van de Kragt et al. (1983)
show that free communication via general, unstructured discussion produces better outcomes than the
same games conducted without communication in the context of public goods games similar to the one
implemented by us. The message space was the entire English language and speaking order was entirely
endogenous, occurring in continuous time with face-to-face communication. An important distinction
from our game is that the contribution costs were equal for all players and common knowledge.
Thus, Van de Kragt et al. (1983) eliminated two important impediments to coordination - private
information and heterogeneity in costs. More structured cheap talk environments with public goods
have been examined by Smith (1980) and Ferejohn et al. (1982). They considered the problem of
designing auction-like auction processes for the provision of discrete public good.
Palfrey and Rosenthal (1991) report results from games similar to the three-person threshold
games considered in this paper and conclude that in the absence of communication, behavior is closely
approximated by the Bayesian equilibrium predictions, except that subjects contribute slightly more
often than predicted. In other experiments, they implemented a binary message stage prior to the
decision making stage and found that this type of communication fails to provide more efficient
outcomes than the ‘no communication’ outcome. They also found that subjects use a cutoff decision
rule when it is optimal to do so in the ‘no communication’ treatment, while players’ behavior is less
systematic with communication.
Several experiments have implemented different forms of communication structures to evaluate
the effect of cheap talk in other games. Cooper et al. (1992) studied one-way communication and two-
way communication in coordination games and concluded that allowing pre-play communication does
not uniformly lead to the play of the Pareto-dominant Nash equilibrium. There are situations where
one-way communication performs significantly better than two-way communication. In a standard
repeated VCM2 model, Bochet et al. (2006) vary the message space used in the cheap talk games
and find that the treatment with exchange of numerical messages does not affect efficiency compared
to the situation with no communication. However, both types of verbal communication, face-to-
2Under a voluntary contribution mechanism (VCM), individuals voluntarily allocate their initial holdings of resources
into the production of public and private goods. Certain assumptions on the payoffs and utilities are made such that
there exists a dominant strategy to not contribute anything to the production of the public good and “free-ride” on the
contributions of others.
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face and anonymous chat, increase cooperation3. Costa and Moreira (2012) implement a two-person
contribution game and find evidence that larger finite message spaces do not provide efficiency gain
relative to the binary communication structure.
3 Theoretical Framework
In this section, we use a mechanism design approach to develop theoretical bounds on the range
of behavior and efficiency that can be achieved under the different communication regimes. There
are four sources of inefficiency that can arise. The first is wasteful undercontribution, which arises
when exactly one individual contributes and the public good is not provided. The second is wasteful
overcontribution, which arises when all three individuals contribute. The public good is provided, but
could have been provided at lower cost. Both of these inefficiencies are coordination failures, and can
also arise where there is no private information and all players have the same cost to contribution.
The third source of inefficiency is the classic free rider problem, whereby the public good is not
provided even though, given the cost realizations, it would be efficient to provide it. The fourth
source inefficiency, which is information, arises when the public good is provided with exactly two
contributors, but their costs are not the two lowest.In this section we explore the extent to which
communication can mitigate the efficiency losses from these four sources of inefficiency.
The Environment
A group consisting of N persons is undertaking a project. Each group member is endowed with one
indivisible unit of input, which may be either consumed or “contributed” to the production of the
group project. The project succeeds if and only if at least K units are contributed. The value of the
project to any individual is normalized to equal 1. The private value of the endowed unit of input
to an individual i is denoted by ci. Each person knows his or her own ci but only knows that the
other players’ c’s are independent random draws from a cumulative distribution distribution F on
[0, C], where F is common knowledge and C > 0. F is admissible if F (0) = 0, F (C) = 1 and F is
continuously differentiable on [0, C], and we assume throughout that F is admissible. The utility for
3The result that face-to-face communication increases contributions in repeated VCM experiments has been shown
by various researchers, including Isaac and Walker (1988), Cason and Khan (1999), Brosig et al. (2003), Belianin and
Novarese (2005). Ostrom and Walker (1991) also find the same result in repeated common property resource situations.
More references are provided in a survey by Ledyard (1995).
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player i with cost ci is given by:
1 + ci if i does not contribute and at least K others contribute
ci if i does not contribute and fewer than K others contribute
1 if i contributes and at least K − 1 other contributes
0 if i contributes and and fewer than K − 1 others contribute
Formally the four sources of inefficiency are the following: wasteful undercontribution, where ex-
actly k ∈ {1, ...,K−1} individuals contribute and the public good is not provided; excess contributions,
where exactly k ∈ {K + 1, ..., N} contribute; underprovision, where the public good is not provided
even though there exist K individuals such that the sum of their costs is less than N (the total social
benefit of providing the public good); and cost inefficiency, where the public good is provided with
exactly K contributors, but their costs are not the K lowest costs. We next explore the extent to which
a benevolent mechanism designer can mitigate the ex ante welfare losses from these three sources of
inefficiency.
Baseline Lower Bound: Equilibrium without communication
We first consider the positive contribution symmetric Bayesian Nash equilibrium of the game without
communication.4 This is a relevant lower bound for efficiency for all four treatments, and provides
the upper bound as well for the no-communication treatment.
This Bayesian equilibrium is characterized by a cutpoint strategy, c∗: player i contributes if an
only if ci ≤ c∗. In our case with a uniform distribution of contribution costs, c∗ solves the equation
c∗ = [2c∗(C − c∗]/C2. The left hand side is the opportunity cost of contributing for a player a
private cost of c∗ and the right hand side is the probability that the player’s contribution is pivotal.
In equilibrium these two are equal. Players with a cost below c∗ are better off contributing, given
others are using the c∗ decision rule and players with private costs greater than c∗ are better off
not contributing. Individuals with a cost of exactly c∗ are indifferent between contributing and not
contributing. Thus, for C = 1, the equilibrium is c∗1.0 = .5 and for C = 1.5, the equilibrium is
c∗1.5 = .375.
4There is also a zero contribution equilibrium that we ignore because it is unstable, as shown in Palfrey and Rosenthal
(1991).
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Upper Bound: Optimal communication equilibrium
With communication, many new additional equilibria arise. The most obvious class of equilibria are
babbling equilibria, where the equilibrium strategies in the communication stage are such that no
information is transmitted. In all of these equilibria, the behavior in the second stage is identical
to the behavior in the game without communication, so these equilibria are not efficiency enhancing.
However, there are more interesting communication equilibria that lead to higher ex ante payoffs for all
players. Moreover, the set of communication equilibria of the game can depend on the message space
and protocol of the communication stage. While there are multiple equilibria with communication5, in
this section we identify efficiency bounds for each of the three communication protocols, and identify
equilibrium strategy profiles that achieve these bounds.
Equilibrium outcomes would be fully efficient if there were a communication equilibrium that
always resulted in the individuals with the lower two token values contributing while the individual
with the highest token value does not contribute. This ‘first best outcome’, however, is not consistent
with equilibrium when C = 1 as there would be incentives to over report token values. Furthermore,
if C = 1.5 then it is not consistent with equilibrium because ex post individual rationality would be
violated: specifically, this ‘first best outcome’ could not be achieved when one or both of the lower two
costs are great than 1. Alternatively, in this C = 1.5 environment one might hope that a ‘constrained
first best outcome’ would be supportable by a communication equilibrium, where (a) individuals with
the lower two token values only contribute if both of the lower two token values are less than or
equal to 1, and (b) no one contributes if one or both of the lower two token values are higher than 1.
However, this would clearly violate incentive compatibility, for the same reasons the first best is not
incentive compatible for C = 1.
For the two communication mechanisms with essentially continuous message spaces (token revela-
tion and unrestricted chat), we use mechanism design theory to characterize the optimal equilibrium.
We model the communication game as direct mechanism in which we imagine that each individual
independently submits a report of their private cost to the mechanism designer from the support
of possible costs (either [0, 1] or [0, 1.5]). The mechanism designer, after receiving all three reports,
makes a recommendation to each player to either contribute or not. An incentive compatible and ex
post individually rational mechanism is one in which, given the mechanism designer’s recommendation
strategy (which may be randomized), it is optimal for each player to honestly report their true private
cost and to obey the recommendation of the mechanism designer. Among this class of mechanisms we
identify the symmetric one that optimizes the ex ante group payoff.6 After this characterization, we
5Palfrey and Rosenthal (1991) characterize a class of equilibria in these games with binary communication.
6Symmetry is without loss of generality.
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turn to the binary communication games, where the characterization is different due to the restricted
message space.
The optimal mechanism design problem
We want to characterize the ex ante efficient equilibrium of the game with communication between the
players. Consider a direct mechanism (p, a) where p : [0, C]N → [0, 1] is the probability of provision as
a function of the reported profile of values; and
{
ai : [0, C]
N → [0, 1]}
i=1,...,N
is the (possibly random)
profile of contribution assignments. In an incentive compatible direct mechanism. In addition, in
the actual contribution game that follows the communication stage, no individual can be forced to
contribute if the payoff from contributing is negative. In particular, this requires at least that ai(c) = 0
for all c ∈[0, C]N such that ci > 1. We refer to this as the ex post individual rationality constraint.7
it must (p, a) must satisfy a collection of interim individual rationality constraints- expected payoff
from the mechanism must be nonnegative. Feasibility requires that (p, a) satisfies an expected budget
constraint. That is, (p, a) is feasible if and only if p(c) ≤ 1K
∑N
i=1 ai(c), for all profiles of individual
costs, c = (c1, ..., cN ). That is the expected sum of the payments must be at least K times the
probability the public good is produced. Without loss of generality we can restrict ourselves to
symmetric mechanisms in these symmetric environments, so the p functions and the a functions
are anonymous. We then work with the reduced form of the mechanism, denoted by (P,A), where
P : [0, C]→ [0, 1] is the expected probability of provision from an interim standpoint for an individual
who has valuation ci; and A : [0, C] → [0, 1] is the expected probability of i contributing from an
interim standpoint for an individual who has valuation ci. That is:
P (c) =
∫
C−i
p(ci, c−i)dF (c−i)
A(c) =
∫
C−i
a(ci, c−i)dF (c−i)
Because feasibility implies that p(c) ≤ 1K
∑N
i=1 a(c), for all c ∈ [0, C]N , the corresponding reduced
form mechanism, (P,A), also must satisfy the budget constraint in expectation, which can be written
7This is only a necessary condition for ex post individual rationality, but it is the only one that is relevant for our
characterization.
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as:8
K
N
C∫
0
P (c)f(c)dc ≤
C∫
0
A(c)f(c)dc (1)
We refer to a mechanism as budget balanced if (??) holds with equality. We next proceed by charac-
terizing the optimal reduced form mechanism, in two different cost distributions, which are used in
the experiment.
Low cost distribution: C = 1
The C = 1 case is the simplest case9 because in any budget balanced mechanism, the ex post individual
rationality constraint will not be binding. We will derive the optimal mechanism below, without
imposing the ex post individual rationality constraint, and then show that the optimal mechanism is
budget balanced and hence the ex post individual rationality constraint is not binding. Thus, for the
case of C = 1 the optimal mechanism is characterized as the solution to the following program:
max
(P,A)
1∫
0
[P (c)− cA(c)] dc (2)
subject to
P (c)− cA(c) ≥ P (c′)− cA(c′) ∀c, c′
K
N
1∫
0
P (c)dc ≤
1∫
0
A(c)dc
0 ≤ P (c) ≤ 1 ∀c, 0 ≤ A(c) ≤ 1 ∀c
The first constraint is incentive compatibility and the other constraints are feasibility. Following
standard arguments from Bayesian mechanism design (see for example Ledyard and Palfrey 2002), one
can show that the solution to this optimization problem is the full provision lottery draft mechanism.
That is, the public good is always produced and a random subset of K individuals contribute, without
regard to individual cost realizations. Thus, the two coordination problems (overcontribution and
overcontribution) and the underprovision inefficiency are perfectly so lved, but the fourth source of
inefficiency, cost ineffiency, is ignored. The reason cost inefficiency is ignored is that the only way
to sort out lower cost types from higher cost types is to sometimes fail to produce the public good.
That is solving the cost inefficiency problem would require reducing the probability the public good
8In principle, there is also the question about whether additional implementability conditions may impose further
constraints on the problem, i.e., the question of whether the optimal reduced form mechanism can be feasibly implemented
by a (p, a) mechanism. As it turns out, for this class of problems it is not an issue.
9The results for this case extend easily to any C such that 0 < C ≤ 1, as shown in the appendix.
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is provided. But the cost of failing to produce the public good is extremely high. In particular, it is
very high relative to the relatively benefits of shifting the cost burden in the direction of lower cost
agents.This result is summarized in the following proposition, and a proof is provided in an appendix.
Proposition 1. If costs are uniformly distributed on [0, 1], then the solution to (??) is P (c) = 1 and
A(c) = KN for all c ∈ [0, 1].
Proof. See Appendix A, which proves a more general result for which this is a special case.
High cost distribution: C = 1.5
If the cost distribution admits costs with ci > 1, as is the case when C = 1.5, then ex post individual
rationality constraints play a role in characterizating the optimal communication mechanism, because
it is irrational for any individual with a cost ci > 1 to contribute, since the individual benefit is only 1.
Thus, the solution of (??) characterized in Proposition 1 violates ex post individual rationality when
C > 1, and the analysis becomes more complicated.
We can write the ex post individual rationality constraint in the reduced form as:
A(c) = 0 ∀c > 1
This constraint also implies that P (c) must be constant for all c > 1, and we will denote this
expected provision for high types as P . Denote by c∗ = inf{c|A(c) = 0} ≤ 1 and observe that U(c) = P
∀c ∈ [c∗, 1.5]. We know c∗ exists, because A(c) = 0∀c > 1 and A′(c) ≤ 0. Denote the portion of P and
A defined on c ≤ c∗ by the functions P̂ : [0, c∗]→ [0, 1] and Â : [0, c∗]→ [0, 1]. With this notation, we
write the optimization problem as:
max
(P̂ ,Â,P ,c∗)
1.5∫
0
U(c)
1
1.5
dc (3)
subject to (4)
U(c) = P ∀c ∈ [c∗, 1.5] (5)
Â(c) = −U ′(c) ∀c ∈ [0, c∗] (6)
U ′′(c) ≥ 0 ∀c ∈ [0, c∗]
K
N
P [1− F (c∗)] +
c∗∫
0
P̂ (c)
1
1.5
dc
 ≤
c∗∫
0
Â(c)
1
1.5
dc
0 ≤ P̂ (c) ≤ P ∀c, 0 ≤ Â(c) ≤ 1 ∀c ∈ [0, c∗]
Following arguments similar to the proof of Proposition 1, we can characterize the optimal com-
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munication mechanism as a solution to (??). The mechanism is not perfectly flat, as was the case
for C = 1, but it is as flat as possible, given the binding constraint imposed by ex post individual
rationality. Specifically, P and A have two flat components, which are separated at a critical cost level,
c∗. Individuals with cost above c∗ never contribute. Individuals with cost below c∗ all contribute with
the same probability.
Proposition 2. If costs are uniformly distributed on [0, C] and C = 1.5, K = 2, N = 3 then the
solution to (??) is given by:
c∗ = 0.75
P (c) = 0.75 ∀c ∈ [0, c∗]
= 0.25 ∀c ∈ [c∗, 1.5]
A(c) = 0.67 ∀c ∈ [0, c∗]
= 0 ∀c ∈ [c∗, 1.5]
Proof. See Appendix A.
This mechanism solves the first two problems of miscoordination, because budget balance is always
satisfied. On the other hand, the existence of an ex post individual rationality constraint means that
the public good is not provided, so the free rider problem is not fully solved. In fact, because C = 1.5
and only two contributors are required, it is always efficient to provide the public good because the
total cost of providing it is always less than 3, which is equal to the sum of public good benefits to the
group. The cost inefficiency problem is also not solved in this mechanism. As with the earlier case
where C ≤ 1, solving the cost inefficiency problem would require reducing the probability the public
good is provided. The cost of reducing the provision probability is very high relative to the benefits
of shifting the cost burden to the lower cost agents.
Binary communication cutpoint equilibrium The optmial mechanisms described above cannot
be implemented with a single round of simultaneous binary communication, which is the simplest
possible message space we explore in the experiment. The message space is just not rich enough to
implement a jointly controlled lottery to randomly selecting exactly K contributors when more than
K individuals indicate a willingness to contribute. An earlier paper (Palfrey and Rosenthal 1991)
identifies a class of cheap talk equilibrium when K=2 and N=3, which we call binary communication
cutpoint equilibrium. It remains an unproven conjecture that these equilibria are the most efficient
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symmetric equilibria of the communication game with one round of simultaneous binary communica-
tion. The message space is {0, 1} and the equilibrium is characterized by two cutpoints, cc and c3.
In the first stage, player i reports “1” if and only if ci ≤ cc.10 Behavior in the second stage depends
on how many players reported “1” in the first stage. If 0 or 1 players reported “1” then nobody con-
tributes in the second stage. If exactly 2 players reported “1” in the first stage, then those two players
contribute in the second stage and the third player does not contribute. If all 3 players reported “1”
in the first stage, then those players use the cutpoint c3 as their strategy in the second stage: i.e.,
contribute if and only if ci ≤ c3.11
The equilibrium is characterized by two equations, one for each cutpoint. The condition in the
cheap talk stage is that a player with ci = cc is indifferent between reporting “1” and “0”, given the
equilibrium continuation in the second period. If all other players use (cc,c3) the expected payoff of
announcing “0” for a player with ci = cc equals:
(cc
C
)2
and the expected payoff for announcing “1” is:
(cc
C
)2(c3
cc
)2
+ 2
(cc
C
)(
1− cc
C
)
(1− cc)
Equating these expressions and collecting terms gives:
(cc)
2 = (c3)
2 + 2 (cc) (C − cc) (1− cc) (7)
The cutpoint in the contribution stage, c3, is characterized by the player with ci = c3 is indifferent
between contributing and not contributing, given everyone else is using equilibrium strategies. This
indifference equation is given by:
2
(
c3
cc
)(
1− c3
cc
)
= c3
which reduces to:
c3 = cc − c
2
c
2
(8)
The equilibrium is obtained by simultaneously solving ?? and ?? for (cc,c3). For our parameters
10Thus, reporting a “1” is interpreted in equilibrium as a conditional promise to contribute.
11Obviously such equilibria can also be implemented with any richer message space, including our token revelation
message space and the open chat message space.
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(C = 1 and C = 1.5), the binary communication equilibrium cutpoints are summarized in Table 1.
C cc c3
1 0.608 0.426
1.5 0.724 0.462
Table 1: Binary communication equilibrium cutpoints.
It is interesting to note that the CCE does not eliminate all the miscoordination inefficiencies. It
is possible for exactly one player to contribute, if his value is less than c3 and the other two players
have values between c3 and cc. Given the parameters of the experiment the chance this happens in
the CCE is very low: probability 0.05 for C = 1 and probability 0.03 for C = 1.5. Similarly, it is
possible for overcontribution in equilibrium, if all three players have values less than c3. Given the
parameters of the experiment the chance this happens in the CCE is also very low: probability 0.07
for C = 1 and probability 0.03 for C = 1.5. Hence the welfare losses from such miscoordination is
very low in expected terms, partly because the event is unlikely and partly because the value of the
wasted contribution is low.
Compared to the optimal mechanism with unlimited communication, the welfare losses in the
communication equilibrium are still very large because of the high probability of non-provision. The
probability of non-provision is approximately 0.39 for C = 1, which is nearly as great as the the
probability of non-provision in the symmetric Bayes Nash equilibrium (0.50), and far worse than the
optimal mechanism, which always produces the public good. For C = 1.5 the probability of non-
provision is 0.56, which is much less than the probability of non-provision in the symmetric Bayes
Nash equilibrium, which is 0.84. Thus the potential gains from binary communication are greater for
C = 1.5 than for C = 1.
4 Experimental Design and Hypotheses
The experimental design, procedures and treatments are discussed in Section 3.1. Section 3.2 provides
the theoretical framework. The hypotheses that are formally tested are listed in Section 3.3.
3.1 Design, Procedures and Treatments
The experiments were conducted at the California Social Science Experimental Laboratory (CASSEL),
University of California, Los Angeles (UCLA) using the Multistage software package. Participants were
recruited from a pool of volunteer subjects, maintained by CASSEL. A total of sixteen sessions were
run, using 183 subjects. Each session consisted of 9-15 participants and no subject participated in
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more than one session12. Upon arrival, instructions were read aloud. Subjects interacted anonymously
with each other through computer terminals. Sessions lasted from 30 to 50 minutes and participants
earned on average US$18.47 in addition to a show-up fee of US$513.
In all the experiments, we set K = 2 and N = 3. Each individual ci is an independent random
draw from a uniform distribution on [0, C], and the experimental design allows for two values of C
(1 and 1.5) corresponding to the two cases analyzed in the theoretical section of the paper. C = 1
means that it is common knowledge that everyone has costs lower than the public benefit and hence,
no one has a dominated contribution strategy. However, in the situation with C = 1.5, individuals
have a strictly dominant strategy not to contribute whenever ci > 1, implying the problem of ex post
individual rationality in the communication equilibria.
The communication structure was varied in each of the two parametric configurations, C = 1 and
C = 1.5. We used four communication treatments: “no communication”, “binary communication”,
“direct revelation”, and “unrestricted text chat”, resulting in a 2× 4 design. We ran two sessions for
each of these treatments, thus a total of 16 sessions. The details of the experimental protocols are
briefly discussed below14. Each session consisted of 20 rounds. After a round was over, participants
were randomly rematched into new three person groups and everyone was independently and randomly
assigned new costs. The random rematching was done to limit the reputation and super-game effects
which might occur with repeated play.
No Communication
Contribution costs were implemented as opportunity costs. In each round, each subject was allocated
a single indivisible “token”, which had a private value that was referred to as a ”token value”. Subjects
were informed that token values in integer increments between 1 to 100C points are independently
drawn with replacement from identical uniform distributions and randomly assigned to subjects. Each
subject was informed of her token value but knew only the probability distribution of other subjects’
token values. Each subject was then asked to enter a decision to spend or keep their token. If at least
two of the three subjects spent their token, then each subject received 100 points if she had chosen to
spend her token, while the payoff was 100 points plus her token value if she had chosen to keep her
token. If a subject chose to spend but none of her other group members spent their tokens then that
subject earned 0 points in the round. If a subject chose to not to spend and fewer than two other
12Eleven sessions had 12 subjects, four sessions had 9 subjects and one session had 15.
13Payoffs ranged from US$11 to US$25.50 with a standard deviation of US$3.18.
14For details, please see the instructions provided in Appendix B.
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group members spent their tokens then that subject earned her token value in the round.15
Binary Communication (”Binary”)
Each round had two stages: a communication stage and a contribution stage. In the communication
stage, subjects chose one of the two messages: “I intend to spend my token”; “I intend to keep
my token”. They were advised that these messages were not binding, and they could make either
contribution decision regardless of which message they sent in the communication round. After these
binary messages were sent, each person was told how many members in their group sent each message,
and was reminded which message he or she had sent. This was directly followed by the contribution
stage, where individuals made binding contribution decisions.
Direct Revelation (”Token”)
Each round again had a communication stage and a contribution stage. In the communication stage,
subjects had 20 seconds to send a message to the other members of her group. They were told that
this message can only be an integer between 1 and 100C and each member was allowed to send only
one such message. Thus, the message space in this treatment corresponds to the direct mechanism and
is much larger than the “binary communication” sessions. Each subject observed the messages sent
by her group members. Each subject was also told that in the event she did not send any message, the
other members of her group would see a “ ? ” against her subject id at the end of the 20 seconds. After
the communication stage was over, individuals made contribution decisions. We called this treatment
“token” because subjects had the opportunity to reveal their true token values. If token values were
revealed truthfully, there would be the opportunity for perfect coordination in the C = 1 condition,
with the two individuals with the lowest token values contributing. In principle, the same could occur
in the C = 1.5 condition, provided at least two individuals had token values no greater than 100.
Unrestricted Broadcast Text Chat (”Chat”)
This treatment consisted of the same number of rounds as in the other ones and had the same
two stages, with the only difference being in the structure of the communication stage. Prior to the
contribution stage, every group had a discussion period which lasted 60 seconds, during which subjects
could send messages to the other members of her group. Individuals were told that the messages had
to conform to certain rules, including that they must be relevant to the experiment and subjects should
not send messages intended to reveal their identity. Thus, the message space under this treatment is
15Due to an error in the computer program, no subject received a token value equal to 100 in the C = 1 treatment
and 150 in the C = 1.5 treatment; the actual distribution was uniform from 1 to 99 or 149, respectively.
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‘anonymous, unrestricted and unstructured text messages’ and is much larger than the finite message
space under the “token revelation” sessions. Importantly, this treatment gave subjects the opportunity
to employ natural language.
3.3 Hypotheses
We test several hypotheses regarding (a) the effect of communication on efficiency, (b) comparison
across communication treatments differing in the richness of message space, and (c) differences across
C = 1 and C = 1.5 sessions.
The effect of communication on efficiency is broken down into four separate hypotheses with
respect to the total earnings generated, the likelihood of public good provision, the number of con-
tributors and the costs of contributors. First, as there exist equilibria under communication that have
higher payoffs for players than in the Bayesian Nash equilibrium without communication, one can
conjecture that the earnings would indeed be higher if communication is allowed. Also, intuitively
one can expect that the public good is provided more often under communication, thereby attaining
Pareto superior outcomes, than under no communication. These give rise to our first two hypotheses:
Hypothesis 1 (Earnings Hypothesis). Total earnings are higher with communication than without
communication.
Hypothesis 2 (Provision Hypothesis). The likelihood of public good provision is greater in the
communication sessions than in the non-communication sessions.
The ex ante efficient solution is for just two individuals to contribute their token as needed, and
for the contributors to be the ones with the two lowest costs while the free rider is the one with the
highest cost (ignoring ties). Without communication, it is impossible for players to know who has
relatively high valuations and who has relatively low ones. Thus the “efficient” outcome can occur only
by chance. However, with sufficient communication, it is at least feasible to coordinate decisions in a
way that produces this desired outcome. Thus, we can expect to have fewer wasteful contributions,
that is, fewer incidences of one or three individuals contributing in the case with communication.
In other words, communication leads to lower production inefficiency by lowering both over and
under-contributions. Also, conditional on the public good being provided, we should have a higher
percentage of the subjects with the two lowest costs contributing when communication is allowed.
Thus, communication can help in two ways: one by reducing coordination failures (such that only
two contribute) and other by making the two lowest costs contributing. Hence, we have the following
hypotheses:
Hypothesis 3a (Under-contribution Hypothesis). The incidence of exactly one person in a group
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contributing is lower in the communication sessions than in the non-communication sessions.
Hypothesis 3b (Over-contribution Hypothesis). The incidence of all members in a group contribut-
ing is lower in the communication sessions than in the non-communication sessions.
Hypothesis 4 (Efficiency Hypothesis). Conditional on the public good being provided, the inci-
dence of individuals with the lower two costs contributing is higher with communication than under no
communication.
We study three different forms of communication structure. While the binary communication
sessions use an exchange of binary messages, the token communication sessions have a much larger
although finite message space, including a null message. The ‘unrestricted text chat’, while anonymous,
uses the entire English language in continuous time. Hence, we have a progression in the treatments
in terms of the richness of the message space implemented. One would expect that it would be easier
to implement efficient outcomes as the message space becomes richer and this leads to a hypthesis
that there will be a monotonic relation between efficiency and richness of the message space:
Hypothesis 5 (Monotone Hypothesis). Efficiency increases with the richness of the message space.
It is highest in the chat treatment, followed by the token treatment, followed by the binary treatment,
and lowest in the no communication treatment.
The final hypothesis compares the provision of public good across the two different C sessions.
When it is common knowledge that every member’s cost is less than the benefit from the public good,
100% provision of public good is possible. However, in the C = 1.5 case, it is no longer possible to
provide the public good all the time assuming subjects do not use dominated strategies. Indeed the
probability that the good isn’t provided equals 727 , when at least two of the subjects have costs greater
than 100. This gives us the following hypothesis:
Hypothesis 6 (C Hypothesis). For each communication protocol, the probability of public good
provision is greater in the C = 1 sessions than in the C = 1.5 sessions.
5 Results
The results from the experiments are reported in this section. We first present the results from testing
the specific hypotheses that we discussed earlier. Subsection 4.2 compares the performance of the
data in all treatments to the various theoretical benchmarks. The final subsection briefly discusses
the behavior in the communication stages of the different treatments.
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4.1 Group Outcomes and Test of Hypotheses
The first hypothesis involves a comparison between the average earnings without communication
to the average earnings with the three communication treatments. Table 2 documents the average
group earnings net of token values in rounds 11-20 four the four treatments, in both C sessions.16
In the C = 1 sessions, average net earnings are higher with communication in both the ”token”
and the ”chat” treatments, but the difference is significant only for the treatment. The other two
communication treatments yield similar earnings as those under ‘no communication’. In the C = 1.5
sessions, ‘unrestricted chat’ results in higher earnings only in the second half of the experiment. We
use the net earnings as opposed to gross earnings to reduce the ‘randomness’ present due to the
realization of the drawn token values.
Taking each group as an independent observation, one-tailed Mann-Whitney tests show that there
is no significant difference in the net group earnings between ‘binary communication’ and ‘no com-
munication’ treatments and between ‘token revelation’ and ‘no communication’ treatments. However,
the differences are statistically significant at the 1% level only between ‘no communication’ and ‘unre-
stricted chat’ implying that only when subjects are provided with unstructured communication in the
form of text chat, they end up with higher earnings. This is true for both C sessions. While differences
are significant between ‘unrestricted chat’ and ‘no communication’ for all rounds in C = 1, this is no
longer the case if all rounds are considered in the C = 1.5 sessions. Indeed, it is clear from Table 2
that earnings are lower or similar in rounds 1-10 and 11-20 in all treatments except ‘unrestricted chat’,
in which case there is an increase in payoffs in the second half of the sessions as compared to the first
half. The above discussion leads us to support Earnings Hypothesis and conclude the following:
Result 1. Total earnings are significantly higher with communication only in the chat condition
(H1).
Table 3 collects the probabilities of the public good provision for all rounds, rounds 1-10, and
rounds 11-20 in each of the four session. An immediate finding is that in line with the previous result,
not all forms of communication increase the likelihood of the good being provided. Clearly, ‘binary
communication’ and ‘token revelation’ sessions result in either similar or lower public good provision
when compared to ‘no communication’ sessions, considering the two C sessions. It is only in the
‘unrestricted chat’ that the provision of good is higher in both C = 1 and C = 1.5 sessions. Moreover,
comparing the numbers for rounds 1-10 and 11-20 reveal that provision declines over time in all other
treatments17 except the ‘unrestricted chat’ where the opposite is true. A difference in proportions
16Unless otherwise noted, throughout this section, we consider only the data from rounds 11-20 for performing the
statistical analyses. Tables reporting the results for the first 10 round and for all 20 rounds combined are in Appendix
C.
17For the ‘token revelation’ there is a marginal increase in C = 1 session but a considerable decline in the other C = 1.5
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z-test for each of the binary comparisons of the ‘communication’ sessions with the ‘no communication’
sessions shows that there is significant difference only between the ‘binary communication’ and ‘no
communication’ in C = 1.5 (at 10% level), and between ‘unrestricted chat’ and ‘no communication’
in both C sessions (at 5% level)18. Supporting Provision Hypothesis, we have the following:
Result 2. The likelihood of public good provision is significantly greater with communication only
in the chat condition, for both cost treatments (H2).
No Comm. Binary Comm. Token Revelation Unrestricted Chat
C = 1
Provision rate 0.43 0.41 0.50 0.98***
Group earnings 88.0 80.2 101.5 221.1***
Observations 70 80 80 60
C = 1.5
Provision rate 0.28 0.38 0.25 0.43**
Group Earnings 39.6 58.7 42.1 83.4***
Observations 80 80 80 80
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.
Table 2: Average group earnings net of token values and frequency of public good provision. Signifi-
cance levels are for differences between the communication treatment and ‘No Communication’.
Next, we turn to the following question: Does communication help in reducing production in-
efficiency in the form of wasteful contributions? While the frequency with which exactly one group
member contributes is always lower with communication in rounds 11-20, the difference is significant
only for the ‘unrestricted chat’ treatment (see Table 4). Also, there is a decline over time in the propor-
tion of situations with only one person contributing in two out of the three communication treatments.
With respect to over-contribution where all three individuals in a group contribute, communication
helps only in the ‘binary communication’ and ‘unrestricted chat’ treatments, that too only for C = 1
sessions. So, communication helps in reducing production inefficiency only through the lowering of
under-contribution. The percentage of over-contribution is already low without any communication.
Thus, supporting Under-contribution Hypothesis and rejecting Over-contribution Hypothesis, we have
the following results:
Result 3a. For both cost treatments, the incidence of exactly one person in a group contributing
is lower in all communication treatments. It is significantly lower in the chat condition (support for
H3a).
session.
18These are results from one-tailed tests of difference in two independent proportions. For the C = 1 situation, the
data numbers do not satisfy the criteria: n(1 − p) > 5, where n is the number of observations and p is the proportion.
But its easy to infer that the proportion is almost 1 under ‘unrestricted chat’ and hence there would be a significant
difference when compared with the ‘no communication’ session.
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Result 3b. For both cost treatments, the incidence of all three persons in a group contributing
is lower in all communication treatments. It is significantly lower only in the C = 1 chat condition
(support for H3b).
Contributors No Comm. Binary Comm. Token Revelation Chat
C = 1
0 11.4 17.4 9.9 0.0***
1 45.7 41.3 40.0 1.7***
2 28.6 35.0 38.8 96.6***
3 14.3 6.3* 11.3* 1.7***
nobs 70 80 80 60
C = 1.5
0 24.9 23.7 35.0 27.5
1 47.5 38.8 40.0 30.0**
2 20.0 35.0 17.5 37.5
3 7.6 2.5 7.5 5.0
nobs 80 80 80 80
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. These significance levels are for difference in
proportions z-tests across the communication treatment and ‘No Communication’.
Table 3: Frequency distribution of number of contributors in percentages, communication treatment.
Results 3a and 3b clearly illustrate one of the most fundamental roles of communication in these
threshold public goods games: communication improves coordination. When either either two or zero
members of the group contribute, there is no miscoordination. There is free riding in the case of
zero contribution, but no wasted contributions. With exactly two contributors, there may be a small
ineffiency due to the private information about costs if the two contributors do not have the two
lowest costs, but there is no miscoordination and no wasted contributions. In contrast, when one or
three members of the group contribute, inefficiencies result purely from miscoordination, resulting in
deadweight loss.
Finally, to combine results 3a and 3b, we compare the frequency of coordinated outcomes (0
or 2 contributors) and the frequency of coordination failures (1 or 3 contributors) across the four
communication treatments an the two cost treatments. This comparison is shown in Table 4. Com-
munication clearly leads to meaningful increases in coordination in all cases. The percentage increases
in coordinated outcomes relative to no communication range from a 17% increase in the case of Token
Revelation with C = 1.5 to a 141% increase in the case of Chat with C = 1. Five out of six increases
relative to no communication are statistically significant.
The most efficient outcome occurs when exactly two people in a group contribute and those two
have the lower two costs. Conditional on the good being provided, Table 5 documents the percentage
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C No Comm. Binary Comm. Token Revelation Chat
C=1 40.0 52.4*** 48.7** 96.6***
C=1.5 44.9 58.7*** 52.5 65.0***
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. These significance levels are for difference in
proportions z-tests across the communication treatment and ‘No Communication’.
Table 4: Frequency of coordinated outcomes (0 or 2 contributors).
of times the subjects with the lower two costs contribute across the four treatments and for each C
session. The numbers are quite high, even without communication. With C = 1, full efficiency would
require 100% of the time the two lowest costs contribute. Obtaining 86.4% in the last 10 rounds of
unrestricted chat is very much higher than pure chance. Furthermore, the loss in value from not always
having the lowest cost contributors is quite small: only 8.2 per round (See Figure 1). With C = 1.5,
the benchmark for the actual draw of tokens is 74% given individual rationality constraints19.
The incidence of subjects with the two lowest costs in a group contributing is higher in all
communication treatments compared to no communication, with the single exception of the C = 1.5
token communication treatment. However, this difference is only significant in the chat treatments
with C = 1. Thus, similar to Results 1 and 2, we conclude that only one form of communication leads
to a statistically significant improvement in cost efficiency:
Result 4. Conditional on the public good being provided, the incidence of individuals with the
lower two costs contributing is significantly higher with communication than no communication only
in the chat treatment (H4).
C No Comm. Binary Comm. Token Revelation Unrestricted Chat
C = 1.0 56.7 (30) 57.6 (33) 65.0 (40) 86.4*** (59)
C = 1.5 68.2 (22) 70.0 (30) 55.0 (20) 79.4 (34)
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. These significance levels are for difference in
proportions z-tests across the communication treatment and ‘No Communication’.
Table 5: Percentage of times exactly two lowest costs contribute, conditional on provision. Number
of observations where the public good is provided in parentheses.
Summarizing the above results, we find that the structure of communication is crucial in deter-
mining whether there is are significant gains over the situation where communication is not possible.
The simultaneous exchange of binary messages aimed at disclosing intentions as well as the one-time
broadcasting of a numerical message lead to some improvements, particularly with respect to a re-
19The draw of tokens differs across communications variation, making the 74.
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duction in the frequency of miscoordination, but these gains are for the most part not large enough
in magnitude to significantly improve average earnings and the probability of public good provision.
With these coarser communication structures, groups also are generally not successful in identifying
the members with lower two token values to contribute. Only when a rich form of continuous time
communication with a “common language” is possible, are there significant gains in efficiency. While
these gains are enormous (approaching the first best outcomes) in the the C = 1 treatment where it is
common knowledge that everyone has a cost that is less than the benefit from the public good, these
gains are harder to achieve in the C = 1.5 treatment, where some individuals can have private costs
that exceed the private benefit.
Given results 1-4, it is now straightforward to test Hypothesis 5. Whether it is measured with
respect to the average group earnings, likelihood of public good provision, incidence of wasteful contri-
butions, or the subjects with lower two costs contributing, there is no strict progression in efficiency as
we move from no communication to binary to a larger numerical message space to finally the “infinite”
communication structure. The relation between efficiency and the richness of message space is weakly
monotonic, but not strictly monotonic as hypothesized.
Result 5. Efficiency does not increase monotonically in the richness of the message space of the
communication stage (reject H5). It is significantly higher only for the chat treatment.
The final hypothesis compares the likelihood of providing the public good in C = 1 and C = 1.5
sessions. There were 489 instances out of 1918 total observations (that is 25.5% of the cases) when
at least two of the subjects in a group had costs higher than 100 in the C = 1.5 sessions. The public
good was provided in 6 out of 114 observations in the ‘binary communication’ treatment. In the other
treatments, the good was never provided when there was only one person in a group having a cost
less than 100 (out of a total of 375 such instances). These numbers strongly support Hypothesis 6.
As can be seen from Table 3, public good provision is much higher in the C = 1 sessions than in the
corresponding C = 1.5 sessions. The differences are significant at the 1% level for direct revelation
communication and unrestricted chat, and at the 5% level for the ‘no communication’ sessions.
Result 6. Keeping the communication protocol fixed, the probability of public good provision is
greater in the C = 1 sessions than in the C = 1.5 sessions (support for H6).
4.2 The quantitative effects of communication on normalized efficiency
We now turn to the analysis of how the outcomes compare with the theoretical bounds discussed in
section 3.2 as well as the first-best outcome. Figure 1 displays normalized efficiency, defined as group
earnings net of token values as a percentage of first best group earnings net of token values. The
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graph displays the data (with 95 percent confidence intervals) and also the normalized efficiency in
the optimal mechanisms characterized in Section 2, based on the actual cost draws in the data. The
normalized efficiency of the Bayesian Nash equilibrium for each treatment are marked on the graph
with horizontal lines, also based on the actual cost draws. The left panel is for the C = 1 data and
the right panel is for the C = 1.5 data.
The normalized efficiency results can be summarized as follows. First, in all cases, groups do
much better than what they would have earned if nobody contributed. That is, normalized efficiency
is significantly greater than zero in all eight treatments. Second, with the exception of the chat com-
munication treatments20, normalized efficiency is significantly lower than in the optimal mechanism.
Third, in all of the C = 1 treatments efficiency is lower than in the Bayes-Nash equilibrium. Fourth,
in contrast to the third finding, for the C = 1.5 data, normalized efficiencies are always higher than
the Bayes Nash equilibrium.
Figure 1: Normalized efficiency net of token values by treatments (rounds 11-20). Also shown are
the 95% confidence intervals. The horizontal line denotes the Bayes-Nash equilibrium normalized
efficiency for each treatment.
4.3 Individual Behavior: Messaging and Contribution Strategies
In this section, we take a deeper look at the individual choice data as a function of individual token
values. We describe several findings about the strategies used by subjects in the communication stage,
and about how the messages in the communication stage affected contribution decisions. These are
presented below, separately for each of the communication structures implemented. We use data from
the last 10 rounds in this section.21
20Interestingly, in the ‘unrestricted chat’ with C = 1, groups do even slightly better than the best IC mechanism and
are close to the first-best outcome.
21For C = 1.5, unless otherwise noted the observations with token values higher than 99 are dropped in this section
because these individuals have a dominant strategy not to contribute, and almost never do. Across all communication
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Binary Communication
We start by analyzing the decision of whether to send an intent to spend message or an intent to
keep message, and to compare this with the theoretical communication equilibrium given in Table 1.
Theoretically, an intent to spend message should be observed 61% of the time in the C = 1 treatment
and 72% of the time in the C = 1.5 treatment (conditional on token values less than 100). The
observed values were 66% and 81%, respectively. Thus, intent to spend messages were observed more
frequently in the C = 1.5 treatment, but in both cases such messages were observed more frequently
than in the communication equilibrium given in Table 1. In both treatments, the frequency of intent
to spend messages was increasing in token value, as shown in the probit regression results displayed
in Table 6.
Next, we look at the effect of the binary messages on the spending decision of a subject. Table 7
shows the effect own binary message and the profile of binary messages of the other two members of
the group on own contribution decision. Because the messages are sent anonymously, it only depends
on the number of other ”intend to spend” messages in the group. The entries in the table are the
contribution rates of the subject in each category. Based on the theoretical communication equilibrium
in Table 1, when C = 1, an individual is expected to contribute 74% of the time after she said that
she intended to contribute in the message stage, while this number is 65% for C = 1.5 sessions. When
C was 1, an individual contributed 55% of the time after she said that she intended to contribute
in the message stage, while this number was 66% for C = 1.5 sessions. In contrast, individuals are
expected to never contribute when they send an intent to keep message. Only 20% of the time did a
person contribute after sending an intent to keep message in the C = 1 sessions, while the comparable
percentage for C = 1.5 groups was 19%.
C = 1 C = 1.5
Tokenvalue -0.005*** (0.002) -0.004** (0.002)
Constant 1.11*** (0.32) 1.61*** (0.40)
Number of observations 240 159
Pseudo R2 0.061 0.056
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
Table 6: Message behavior in the ‘Binary Communication’ treatment: Marginal effects from a probit
regression with ”message” as the dependant variable. Standard errors, clustered at the subject level,
are in parentheses.
The main departure from the theoretical conditional contribution rates, is that in theory, if you
treatments, in 632 cases where an individual’s token value was greater than 100, there were only 11 observations of
contribution.
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Number of others saying “I intend to spend”
Message sent by me 0 1 2
C = 1
“I intend to spend” 0.41 (22) 0.60 (48) 0.56 (90)
“I intend to keep” 0.25 (12) 0.23 (44) 0.13 (24)
C = 1.5
“I intend to spend” 0.38 (21) 0.82 (49) 0.62 (58)
“I intend to keep” 0.00 (1) 0.16 (19) 0.27 (11)
Table 7: Fraction of times spent as a function of binary message profile. Total observations in paren-
theses.
and exactly one other individual sends a spend message then your predicted contribution rate is 100%.
This is not what we observe in the data, especially in the C = 1 data. In the C = 1 sessions, out of 48
observations with “I intend to spend my token” with exactly one other member sending this message,
only 29 contribute. When no other member sent that message, only 9 of 22 contributed, but in the
communication equilibrium none of these should be contributing. When both other members also
reported that they intended to spend 49 out of 90 contributed (54%), while in theory this is predicted
to be somewhat greater (70%). For C = 1.5 sessions, only 38% of subjects who reported an intent to
spend carry out that intent when nobody else in the group send the spend message. This contrasts
with much higher rates when at least one other member says they intend to spend: 82% with one
other and 62% with two others.
While these conditional contribution rates are different from the theoretical ones implied by Table
1, they reveal some interesting patterns in the contribution rates of individual who report an intent
to spend. First, individuals are always more likely than not to carry out a reported intent to spend
than not only if at least one other member of the group also reports an intent to spend. Second,
this effect is strongest when exactly one other member reports an intent to spend. These patterns
provide some additional insight into the earlier finding that binary communication partially alleviates
the coordination failure that occurs when exactly one individual contribute (see Tables 3 and 4).
Individuals who report an intent to keep are always much more likely to keep than spend, regard-
less of how many other members of the group report an intent to spend. In cases where an individual
reports ”intend to keep”, the effect of other messages on contribution decisions is small, and with no
clear pattern. In the C = 1 treatment, the probability of contributing declines very slightly with the
number of other members who intend to spend, but it goes the other direction in the C = 1 treatment.
To evaluate the statistical significance of these effects, Table 8 shows the results of a probit
regression with contribution decision as the binary dependent variable, as well as whether the subject
sent the message “I intend to spend my token” (mi = 1) or “I intend to keep my token” (mi = 0).
We denote the number of other members in a group saying “I intend to spend” in the message stage
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as M−i. The independent variables are as follows: own token value (tokenvaluei), 1{M−i = 1}: a
binary variable indicating whether exactly one of the other two members sent the message “I intend
to spend” and 1{M−i = 2}: a binary variable indicating whether both the other members sent the
message “I intend to spend”.
The regression results in Table 8 confirm the effects identified in Table 7. Given that an individual
has sent “I intend to spend” message, she is more likely to contribute if there was at least one other
member who expressed the willingness to spend in the message stage. This effect is significant in
three of four cases, and the effect is strongest if there was exactly one other person in the group who
reported an intent to spend. In contrast, none of the M−i coefficients are significant in case mi = 0
mi = 0 mi = 1 mi = 0 mi = 1
C = 1 C = 1 C = 1.5 C = 1.5
tokenvaluei -0.005*** (0.002) -0.01*** (0.003) -0.005 (0.003) -0.005*** (0.002)
1{M−i = 1} -0.01 (0.14) 0.26* (0.15) -0.037 (0.13) 0.23** (0.1)
1{M−i = 2} -0.16 (0.11) 0.27* (0.16) 0.41 (0.3) 0.06 (0.1)
Constant 0.52 (0.66) 1.02*** (0.37) 0.23 (0.94) 0.82** (0.34)
Number of observations 80 160 31 128
Pseudo R2 0.158 0.262 0.238 0.108
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
Table 8: Decision in the Binary Communication treatment: Marginal effects from probit regression
with “contribution decision” as the dependant variable, evaluated at the means of the independent
variables. Standard errors, clustered at the subject level, are in parentheses.
Token Revelation
In the ‘token revelation’ treatment, individuals rarely chose the option of sending an empty message
(7.5% of the time in C = 1 groups and 14% of the time when C was 1.5). In C = 1 groups, 49% of the
reports were truthful and 41% of the reports were lower than the true token values, while individuals
over-reported their token values only 10% of the time. A similar pattern was observed in the C = 1.5
groups, where 44% of the reports were truthful, 38% were under-reported and 18% over-reported.
Again, from the prevalence of under-reporting of token values it seems that individuals were trying
to signal their group members that they can expect a contribution, perhpas believing that their own
low report would induce others to contribute. In the C = 1.5 sessions, individuals with token values
greater than 100 under-reported 55% of the time while they reported truthfully around 35% of the
time. This behavior is more difficult to rationalize, but again it’s possible that subjects again thought
this would induce greater contribution by others. Out of 71 such instances when their token values
were higher than 100, 36 times they sent a message less than 100. That appears to be one of the
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primary reasons of why efficiency is so low with direct mechanism communication when C is 1.5. In
contrast, out of 135 cases when the token value was less than 100, only 16% of the time individuals
sent a message greater than 100. They were truthful 48% of the time and over-reported 23% of the
time.
Table 9 reports the results of a linear regression of the reported token value as a function of
an individual’s true token value22. As is evident, there is a significant positive relationship between
token values and reported token values. We ran a probit regression is run to analyze how the mes-
sages exchanged in the ‘token revelation’ round affect the contribution decision of a subject23. The
dependant variable is the contribution decision which is binary: 1 if the individual contributes and
0 otherwise. The exogenous variables are (i) an individual’s own tokenvalue(tokenvaluei), and (ii)
1{tokenvaluei > max{mj}j 6=i}: a binary variable indicating whether or not the subject’s token value
is greater than the messages sent by other two members. We expect the sign of the coefficient on the
variable 1{tokenvaluei > max{mj}j 6=i} to be negative, meaning that an individual is less likely to
contribute if her tokenvalue is higher than the other two members’ reports. The coefficient is signif-
icant and negative only for C = 1 groups. Also, there is no systematic effect of own token value on
the individual contribution decision. These findings, coupled with the fact that there is widespread
mis-reporting of token values are suggestive of why groups are unable to use the ‘token revelation’
stage for much gain in efficiency.
C = 1 C = 1.5
Tokenvalue 0.38** (0.07) 0.82** (0.12)
Constant 17.18*** (3.79) 13.10*** (6.75)
Number of observations 222 135
R2 0.104 0.110
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
Table 9: Message behavior in the direct mechansim communication treatment: Linear regression with
reported token value as the dependant variable. Standard errors, clustered at the subject level, are in
parentheses.
Unrestricted Text Chat
We investigate the question of how pre-play communication in the form of unrestricted text chat helps
subjects achieve higher payoffs. Table 10 gives the details of how many times a group reached some
form of an agreement about the possible profile of actions to be taken by the members in the group
22The few observations where a subject did not send a message are dropped from the regression.
23The observations where at least one member of a group did not send any message are dropped.
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C = 1 C = 1.5
Tokenvalue -0.014*** (0.002) -0.013*** (0.003)
1{tokenvaluei > max{mj}j 6=i} -0.183* (0.107) 0.029 (0.131)
Constant 1.90*** (0.21) 1.71*** (0.32)
Number of observations 222 135
Pseudo R2 0.32 0.31
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
Table 10: Decision in the direct mechansim communication treatment: Marginal effects from probit
regression with contribution decision as the dependant variable, evaluated at the mean of independent
variables. Standard errors, clustered at the subject level, are in parentheses.
in the contribution stage.24
Groups reached an agreement nearly 88% of the time in C = 1 treatment, and these agreements
were carried out 94% of the time (99 out of 105). The ability of groups to reach agreements and
carry them out was not nearly as successful in the C = 1.5 treatment. The percentage of groups
who reached an agreement was only 58%, which is significantly lower. Moreover, of those groups that
reached agreement, only 38% (35 out of 93) carried out the agreement. The qualitative nature of the
agreements was also different across the cost treatments. In the C = 1.5 treatment fewer than half the
agreements (38 out of 93) were for exactly two of the group members to spend, the efficient outcome,
and only 20 of these groups carried out that efficient agreement. Just as many groups agreed to the
non-credible agreement for all three to contribute. Not surpisingly these agreements were carried out
only 8% of the time (3 out of 38). The agreements in the C = 1 treatment were much different. 98
out of 105 agreements were for exactly two contributors and this was carried out 94% of the time
(92 out of 98). There were five agreements for all three to spend and, perhaps surprisingly, all of
these agreements were carried out. The difference between the C = 1.5 and C = 1 treatments is even
starker after subjects have gained experience. In rounds 11-20 of the C = 1 treatment agreements
were nearly always reached (56/60) and moreover all 56 agreements were for exactly two contributors,
and only once did the agreement failed to be carried out. In rounds 11-20 of the C = 1.5 groups, there
was a slight increase in the number of agreements for exactly two contributors (from 12/80 to 26/80),
but these agreements were carried out less than half the time, which is the same rate as in the early
rounds. Otherwise there was no notable change with experience in group agreements for the C = 1.5
groups.
A group agrees to either of the three action profiles: (i) all members will spend their token, (ii)
two of the members will spend their tokens, or (iii) everybody in the group will keep their tokens.
24Here we present data for all rounds, because there are interesting comparisons between early and late rounds.
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Table 12 shows that when a group decides that all members should keep their tokens, they carry out
this agreement quite well, almost 100% of the time, but when everyone in a group decides to spend
their tokens, then only in a few number of cases they carry out this action. Of course, this is expected
as a member might think that she could just keep her token while the other two are going to spend.
This thinking actually leads to none or only one person contributing.
Rounds Agreements Agreed Number Spending
C = 1 0 1 2 3
1-10 49 (60) 2 (2) 0(0) 37 (42) 5 (5)
11-20 56 (60) 0 (0) 0(0) 55 (56) 0 (0)
All rounds 105 (120) 2 (2) 0(0) 92 (98) 5 (5)
C = 1.5
1-10 39 (80) 4 (5) 1(3) 6 (12) 0 (19)
11-20 54 (80) 6 (6) 1(3) 14 (26) 3 (19)
All rounds 93 (160) 10 (11) 2(6) 20 (38) 3 (38)
Table 11: Agreement on an action profile in the communication stage: the first column gives the
frequency of times a group reaches an agreement. Columns 2-4 gives the number of times the group
members carry out the agreed action profile in the contribution stage (number of observations in
parentheses).
To summarize, the most striking feature of the chat communication is that when a group reaches
an agreement in the C = 1 sessions in rounds 11-20, 100% of the time they decide that exactly 2
members will spend their tokens and they nearly always carry out this agreed upon profile of actions.
This explains the extremely high efficiency levels reached in rounds 11-20 in C = 1 sessions. This
degree of success is not even close to being achieve by the C = 1.5 groups, although the frequency of
groups agreeing to profiles where exactly two memebers spend their tokens is slightly higher in rounds
11-20, which accounts for the slightly the higher efficiency in rounds 11-20 than the first ten rounds
of play in the C = 1.5 groups.25
Content Analysis of Chat Messages
Finally, we provide a content analysis of the discussion in the communication round of the chat sessions
to give a more complete picture of how the chat communication facilitated cooperation and coordi-
nation. Each message sent by a subject was coded into one of the nine mutually exclusive categories,
25Table XX in the appendix compares the efficiency differences in the first ten and last ten rounds.
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Code category Examples
Confirmation okay; cool; yes; alright; done; great; yep
Own token value token value is 39; I have a really high
value; its so low
Others’ token value or plan of action what is your token value 3?; are you going
to spend 2?
Strategy suggestion about others/own de-
cision/group decision
I should keep my token; 1 and 2 should
spend and 3 keep; everyone should spend;
can I keep?
Informative/explaining something to
group members but not any strategy
suggestion
if 2 spend then they both get 100; token
values can never be higher than 100
I plan to spend spending; I will spend
I plan to keep keeping; I will keep
Conditional statement or ambigu-
ous/contradictory statement
I will spend if someone else spends; I will
keep if you two spend; “I will keep” then
later on says “I will spend”; I will spend
or keep
Irrelevant/Junk lol; hehehe
Table 12: Content analysis: code categories.
as enlisted in Table 13. The table also contains some verbatim examples of sentences/messages that
fall under each category that were used in our experiments. While the instructions did not indicate
that the chat was to be in English, subjects communicated in a language that was closer to SMS
texts than to ordinary English. Table 14 gives the percentage of all messages that fall in these nine
categories in all four sessions of the ‘unrestricted chat’ treatment. While “confirmation”/“strategy
suggestion”/“revelation of own token value” were used a lot in the C = 1 sessions, there was a pre-
dominance of informative discussions and messages related to revealing the intent to spend in the
C = 1.5 sessions. Messages falling in categories “strategy suggestion” and “confirmation” were used
less in sessions with C = 1.5 than in the C = 1 sessions. Table 14 also shows that individuals used
conditional statements or ambiguous messages very rarely in all of the sessions. Lastly, there was also
no notable difference in the messages sent over time.
Thus, we see that revealing one’s own token value coupled with a strategy suggestion about one’s
own as well as the entire group’s strategies helps in achieving “efficient” outcomes in the situation
when it is common knowledge that everyone has costs less than the ‘public’ benefit. However, in the
other situation, there is a lack of use of these message categories and efficiency is also not as high.
Apart from this, a closer look at the transcript of the text chat reveals that in the C = 1.5 sessions
there is a lot of discussion regarding lying, trust and promises whereas, none of these terms are used
when C = 1. So, in the C = 1.5 sessions, there is an atmosphere of mistrust which is certainly a
reason as to why subjects do not do as well in these sessions even with unrestricted text chat. A quote
from one of the texts from a subject aptly summarizes the situation: “this test really shows how low
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Code category C = 1 C = 1.5
Confirmation 16.8 5.8
Own token value 24.3 12.6
Others’ token value or plan of action 5.8 11.1
Strategy suggestion about others/own de-
cision/group decision
16.2 6.4
Informative/explaining something to
group members but not any strategy
suggestion
6.9 19.2
I plan to spend 11.7 17.4
I plan to keep 4.4 8.6
Conditional statement or ambigu-
ous/contradictory statement
1.5 3.3
Irrelevant/Junk 12.4 15.6
Table 13: Content analysis: percentage of messages falling in the code categories.
humans have fallen”.
6 Conclusion
We investigated the effect on efficiency, in a public good game where player endowments are private
information, of non-binding pre-play communication structures differing in the richness of the message
space. Neither the one-time simultaneous exchange of binary messages meant to reveal one’s intention
to contribute nor the one-time display of a numerical message is enough to create any efficiency gain
relative to the situation without any form of communication. Only when participants are provided
with the opportunity to engage in text chat in an unrestricted fashion (though anonymous), earnings
and public good provision are significantly higher. Thus, it seems that without a ‘common language’
there is no ‘obvious’ way to interpret the binary or the numerical messages among subjects. The
natural language results hold even when the groups are rotated every round, as is the case in our
experiments. Unrestricted chat gives the subjects the opportunity to understand and interpret each
others’ intentions and messages. Also, gains relative to the situation with no communication are higher
when it is common knowledge that everyone has costs less than the ‘public’ benefit. This is intuitive
because in this situation the question is not whether the good should be provided but rather which of
the two people in a group are going to provide it. In contrast, in the sessions where it is possible for
individuals to have higher costs than the ‘public’ benefit, first one needs to figure out whether a good
should be provided and hence, there are more chances of mis-coordination and mis-representation.
32
References
[1] Agastya, M., Menezes, F. and Sengupta, K. (2007), “Cheap talk, efficiency and egalitarian cost
sharing in joint projects,” Games and Economic Behavior, 60, 1-19.
[2] Bagnoli, M. and McKee, M. (1991), “Voluntary contribution games: efficient private provision of
public goods,” Economic Inquiry, 29(2), 351-366.
[3] Baliga, S. and Sjostrom, T. (2004), “Arms races and negotiations,” Review of Economic Studies,
71, 351-369.
[4] Belianin, A. and Novarese, M. (2005), “Trust, communication and equilibrium behavior in public
goods,” Working paper.
[5] Blume, A., DeJong, D. V., Kim, Y-G and Sprinkle, G. B. (1998), “Experimental evidence on the
evolution of meaning of messages in sender-receiver games,” American Economic Review, 88(5),
1323-1340.
[6] Bochet, O., Page, T. and Putterman, L. (2006), “Communication and punishment in voluntary
contribution experiments,” Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, 60, 11-26.
[7] Brosig, J., Ockenfels, A. and Weimann, J. (2003), “The effect of communication media on coop-
eration,” German Economic Review, 4, 217-242.
[8] Cai, H. and Wang, J. T-Y (2006), “Overcommunication in strategic information transmission
games,” Games and Economic Behavior, 56(1), 7-36.
[9] Cason, T. and Khan, F. (1999), “A laboratory study of voluntary public goods provision with
imperfect monitoring and communication,” Journal of Development Economics, 58, 533-552.
[10] Cooper, R., DeJong, D., Forsythe, R. and Ross, T. (1992), “Communication in coordination
games,” Quarterly Journal of Economics, 107, 739-771.
[11] Costa, F. J. and Moreira, H. A. (2012), “On the limits of cheap talk for public good provision,”
Working paper.
[12] Crawford, V. P. and Sobel, J. (1982), “Strategic information transmission,” Econometrica, 50(6),
1431-1451.
[13] Dawes, R. M., Orbell, J. M., Simmons, R. T. and Van de Kragt, A. (1986), “Organizing groups
for collective action,” American Political Science Review, 80(4), 1171-1185.
33
[14] Dickhaut, J. W., McCabe, K. A. and Mukherji, A. (1995), “An experimental study of strategic
information transmission,” Economic Theory, 6(3), 389-403.
[15] Farrell, J. (1993), “Meaning and credibility in cheap-talk games,” Games and Economic Behavior,
5, 514-531.
[16] Farrell, J. and Gibbons, R. (1989), “Cheap talk can matter in bargaining,” Journal of Economic
Theory, 48 (1), 221-237.
[17] Farrell, J. and Saloner, G. (1988), “Coordination through committees and markets,” The Rand
Journal of Economics, 19, 235-252.
[18] Ferejohn, F., Forsythe, R., Noll, R. and Palfrey, T. R. (1982), “An experimental examination
of auction mechanisms for discrete public goods,” in V. Smith ed. Research in Experimental
Economics, Vol 2, 175-199, JAI Press.
[19] Forges, F. (1986), “An approach to communication equilibria,” Econometrica, 54, 1375-1386.
[20] Forges, F. (1990), “Equilibria with communication in a job market example,” Quarterly Journal
of Economics, 105, 375-398.
[21] Gilligan, T. and Krehbiel, K. (1987), “Collective decision-making and standing committees: an
informational rationale for restrictive amendment procedures,” Journal of Law, Economics, and
Organization, 3(2), 287-335.
[22] Goeree, J. and C. Holt (2005), “An Explanation of Anomalous Behavior in Models of Political
Participation,” American Political Science Review, 99(2), 201-213.
[23] Isaac, R. M. and Walker, J. M. (1988), “Communication and free-riding behavior: the voluntary
contribution mechanism,” Economic Inquiry, 264, 585-608.
[24] Kawamura, K. (2011), “A model of public consultation: why is binary communication so com-
mon?,” The Economic Journal, 121, 819-842.
[25] Ledyard, J. (1995), “Public goods: a survey of experimental research,” in J. Kagel and A. Roth
eds. Handbook of Experimental Economics, Princeton: Princeton University Press.
[26] Ledyard, J. and Palfrey, T. R. (1994), “Voting and lottery drafts as efficient public goods mech-
anisms,” Review of Economic Studies, 61, 327-355.
[27] Ledyard, J. and Palfrey, T. R. (2007), “A general characterization of interim efficient mechanisms
for independent linear environments,” Journal of Economic Theory, 133(1), 441-466.
34
[28] Matthews, S. (1989), “Veto threats: rhetoric in a bargaining game,” Quarterly Journal of Eco-
nomics, 104, 347-369.
[29] Matthews, S. and Postlewaite, A. (1989), “Preplay communication in two-person sealed-bid dou-
ble auction,” Journal of Economic Theory, 48, 238-263.
[30] Myerson, R. (1986), “Multistage games with communication,” Econometrica, 54, 323-358.
[31] Offerman, T., A. Schram, and J. Sonnemans (1998), ”Quantal response models in step-level public
good games” European Journal of Political Economy, 14(1), 89-100.
[32] Ordeshook, P. and Palfrey, T. R. (1988), “Agendas, strategic voting, and signaling with incom-
plete information,” American Journal of Political Science, 32, 441-466.
[33] Ostrom, E. and Walker, J. M. (1991), “Communication in a commmons: cooperation without
external enforcement,” in T. R. Palfrey, ed. Laboratory Research in Political Economy, Ann Arbor:
University of Michigan Press.
[34] Palfrey, T. R. and Rosenthal, H. (1988), “Private incentives and social dilemmas: the effects of
incomplete information and altruism,” Journal of Public Economics, 35, 309-332.
[35] Palfrey, T. R. and Rosenthal, H. (1991), “Testing for effects of cheap talk in a public goods game
with private information,” Games and Economic Behavior, 3, 183-220.
[36] Smith, V. (1980), “Experiments with a decentralized mechanism for public good decisions,” Amer-
ican Economic Review, 70, 584-599.
[37] Van de Kragt, A., Orbell, J. and Dawes, R. (1983), “The minimal contributing set as a solution
to public goods problems,” American Political Science Review, 77, 112-121.
35
APPENDICES
A Proofs of Propositions 1 and 2
Low Cost Distribution (C ≤ 1)
Proposition 1. If costs are uniformly distributed on [0, 1], then the solution to (??) is P (c) = 1 and
A(c) = KN for all c ∈ [0, 1].
Proof. We prove a more general version of this proposition this below for any admissible F .26 Denot-
ing U(c) = P (c)− cA(c), we have, from incentive compatibility that in any differentiable mechanism
we must have U ′(c) = −A(c) ≥ 0 and U ′′(c) = −A′(c) ≥ 0, and differentiability of U and A holds
almost everywhere in [0, 1]. Hence we can rewrite the optimization problem as:
max
(P,A)
C∫
0
U(c)f(c)dc (9)
subject to
A(c) = −U ′(c) ∀c
U ′′(c) ≥ 0 ∀c
K
N
C∫
0
P (c)f(c)dc ≤
C∫
0
A(c)f(c)dc
0 ≤ P (c) ≤ 1 ∀c, 0 ≤ A(c) ≤ 1 ∀c
The first incentive constraint, A(c) = −U ′(c) implies we can write
U(c) = U(0)−
c∫
0
A(x)dx
26We conjecture that the requirement that F be admissible is stronger than is needed. Perhaps all that is needed is
that there are no mass points.
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we can rewrite ?? as
max
(P,A)
U(0)−
∫
0
 c∫
0
A(x)dx
 f(c)dc (10)
subject to
U ′′(c) ≥ 0 ∀c
K
N
C∫
0
P (c)f(c)dc ≤
C∫
0
A(c)f(c)dc
0 ≤ P (c) ≤ 1 ∀c, 0 ≤ A(c) ≤ 1 ∀c
which is equivalent to:
max
(P,A)
U(0)−
C∫
0
A(c)dc +
C∫
0
F (c)A(c)dc (11)
subject to
U ′′(c) ≥ 0 ∀c
K
N
C∫
0
P (c)f(c)dc ≤
C∫
0
A(c)f(c)dc
0 ≤ P (c) ≤ 1 ∀c, 0 ≤ A(c) ≤ 1 ∀c
Let (P ∗, A∗) be a solution to (??), denote A =
C∫
0
A∗(c)dc, and note that U∗(0) = P ∗(0)−A∗(0).
Whatever the solution, it must be that A∗(·) solves:
max
A(·)
C∫
0
F (c)A(c)dc
subject to
A(0) = A∗(0)
A′(c) ≤ 0 ∀c
C∫
0
A(c)dc = A
0 ≤ A(c) ≤ 1 ∀c
Because F is nonnegative and strictly increasing and A is required to be nonincreasing, this im-
mediately implies that A∗′ = 0 and hence A∗(c) = A for all c. Because A∗ is flat, incentive
compatibility implies that P ∗ is also flat, with P ∗(c) = P ∗(0) for all c.Furthermore, it must be
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that A
∗
is as small as possible, subject to the feasibility constraint, implying immediately that
K
N
C∫
0
P ∗(c)f(c)dc =
C∫
0
A∗(c)f(c)dc. Hence, the problem reduces to finding the optimal flat mecha-
nism that is also budget balanced, which trivially implies P ∗(c) = 1 for all c and A∗(c) = KN ∀c. In
other words, the public good is always provided, and exactly K individuals are randomly selected to
contribute. Observe that ex post individual rationality is satisfied and also that implementability of
the reduced form mechanism is trivial.Thus, the ex ante efficient mechanism does not use any informa-
tion about types. It completely solves the coordination problem of over- and under-contribution, and
the free rider problem but is completely unable to resolve the informational souce of cost inefficiency
which would require low cost types to contribute more often than high cost types.
We conjecture that the requirement that F be admissible is stronger than is needed. Perhaps all
that is needed is that there are no mass points.
High cost distribution: C = 1.5
Proposition 2. If costs are uniformly distributed on [0, 1.5], K = 2, and N = 3, then the solution to
(??) is given by:
c∗ = 0.75
P (c) = 0.75 ∀c ∈ [0, c∗]
= 0.25 ∀c ∈ [c∗, 1.5]
A(c) = 0.67 ∀c ∈ [0, c∗]
= 0 ∀c ∈ [c∗, 1.5]
Proof. As for Proposition 1, we provide a more general proof for the case where K,N are arbitrary
integers with 1 ≤ K ≤ N .
Because IC implies A(c) = −U ′(c) ∀c, we have:
U(c) = U(1.5) +
1.5∫
c
A(x)dx
= P +
max{c,c∗}∫
c
Â(x)dx
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so the optimization problem can be rewritten as:
max
(P̂ ,Â,P ,c∗)
P +
1.5∫
0
 max{c,c
∗}∫
c
Â(x)dx
 1
1.5
dc (12)
subject to
U ′′(c) ≥ 0 ∀c
K
N
P
[
1− c
∗
1.5
)
]
+
c∗∫
0
P̂ (c)
1
1.5
dc
 ≤
c∗∫
0
Â(c)
1
1.5
dc
0 ≤ P̂ (c) ≤ P ∀c, 0 ≤ Â(c) ≤ 1 ∀c ∈ [0, c∗]
where 11.5 is just the density function of the cost distribution. This is equivalent to:
max
(P̂ ,Â,P ,c∗)
P +
c∗∫
0
c
1.5
Â(c)dc (13)
subject to
U ′′(c) ≥ 0 ∀c
K
N
P
[
1− c
∗
1.5
]
+
c∗∫
0
P̂ (c)
1
1.5
dc
 ≤
c∗∫
0
Â(c)
1
1.5
dc
0 ≤ P̂ (c) ≤ P ∀c, 0 ≤ Â(c) ≤ 1 ∀c ∈ [0, c∗]
Let (P̂ ∗, Â∗, P ∗, c∗) be a solution to (??), denote A =
c∗∫
0
Â(c) 11.5dc. If this is optimal, then it must be
that the budget constraint holds with equality. That is:
K
N
P ∗
[
1− c
∗
1.5
]
+
c∗∫
0
P̂ ∗(c)
1
1.5
dc
 = A∗
If not, P can be increased without violating any constraints and increases the objective function,
P +
c∗∫
0
c
1.5Â(c)dc. This implies that whenever the public good is produced, it is produced with exactly
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K contributions. Second, as in the case studied earlier, with C ≤ 1, for any A, Â∗(c) must solve:
max
Â(·)
c∗∫
0
c
1.5
Â(c)dc
subject to
Â′(c) ≤ 0 ∀c ∈ [0, c∗]
c∗∫
0
Â(c)dc = A
0 ≤ A(c) ≤ 1 ∀c ∈ [0, c∗]
Because F is nonnegative and strictly increasing and Â is required to be nonincreasing, this imme-
diately implies that Â∗′ = 0 and hence Â∗(c) = A∗ for all c ∈ [0, c∗]. Because Â∗ is flat, incentive
compatibility implies that P̂ ∗ is also flat, with P̂ ∗(c) = P ∗ for all c ∈ [0, c∗]. Next observe that, given
any c∗, P is maximized by producing the good whenever at least K individuals have a cost c ∈ [0, c∗].
Budget balance then implies that whenever this is the case, the individuals share the cost equally.
Hence the mechanism looks qualitatively very similar to the optimal mechansim when C ≤ 1. In the
direct version of this mechanism, everyone reports their cost, if at least K individuals report a cost
less than or equal to c∗, the public good is produced and exactly K of these ”low cost” individuals
are randomly selected to contribute. Otherwise the public good is not produced at all. Finally, the
critical cost, c∗, is pinned down by incentive constraint on the c∗ type, who must be indifferent be-
tween reporting c∗ with an expected payoff of P ∗ − c∗A∗ and reporting some higher cost and getting
an expected payoff of P ∗. Thus, c∗ is characterized by:
P
∗ − c∗A∗ = P ∗ (14)
Where, by the characterization above, we have:
P
∗
=
N−1∑
j=K−1
(
N − 1
j
)[
c∗
1.5
]j [
1− c
∗
1.5
]N−1−j
(15)
P ∗ =
N−1∑
j=K
(
N − 1
j
)[
c∗
1.5
)
]j [
1− c
∗
1.5
]N−1−j
A
∗
=
N−1∑
j=K−1
K
j + 1
(
N − 1
j
)[
c∗
1.5
]j [ c∗
1.5
]N−1−j
If there are multiple values of c∗ ∈ [0, 1) that solve ??, then the optimal mechanism corresponds to
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the highest such value of c∗, because it leads to the highest possible value of P .27
Solution for experimental parameters: K=2, N=3
Substituting into (??) the specific values K = 2, N = 3, and denoting q = c
∗
1.5 , we get
P
∗
= q2 + 2q(1− q)
P ∗ = q2
A
∗
=
2
3
q2 + 2q(1− q)
where q = c
∗
1.5 . Solving for q using (??) gives q = 0.5. Hence c
∗ = 0.75, P ∗ = 0.25, P ∗ = 0.75 and
A
∗
= 23 . The ex ante probability the public good will be provided is 0.50. This can also be implemented
in the chat communication or in the token revelation communication protocols.
27We conjecture that the above proof extends to non-uniform distributions. For similar reasons to proposition 1,
the argument above probably goes through for any continuously differentiable distribution function F on [0, C], where
0 < C ≤ 1, F (0) = 0 and F (C) = 1. However, the existence of the binding ex post individual rationality constraint lead
to some technical problems that will require stronger assumptions about F .
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B Sample Instructions
Thank you for agreeing to participate in this group decision making experiment. During the experi-
ment we require your complete, undistracted attention, and ask that you follow instructions carefully.
You should not open other applications on your computer, chat with other students, or engage in
other distracting activities, such as using your phone, reading books, etc.
You will be paid for your participation in cash, at the end of the experiment. Different participants
may earn different amounts. What you earn depends partly on your decisions, partly on the decisions
of others, and partly on chance.
The entire experiment will take place through computer terminals, and all interaction between
you will take place through the computers. It is important that you not talk or in any way try to
communicate with other participants during the experiment, except as instructed.
We will start with a brief instruction period. During the instruction period, you will be given a
complete description of the experiment and will be shown how to use the computers. If you have any
questions during the instruction period, raise your hand and your question will be answered out loud
so everyone can hear. If you have any questions after the experiment has begun, raise your hand, and
an experimenter will come and assist you.
You will make choices over a sequence of 20 matches. In each match, you will be assigned to a
group with two other participants in the room. In every match, you and the two other participants
you are matched with each makes a single decision. Your earnings for that match will depend on all
three group members’ decisions, but are completely unaffected by the decisions made by participants
assigned to other groups. We will explain exactly how these payoffs are computed in a minute.
At the end of the session, you will be paid the sum of what you have earned in all matches, plus
the show-up fee of $ 5. Everyone will be paid in private and you are under no obligation to tell others
how much you earned. Your earnings during the experiment are denominated in points. At the end
of the experiment you will be paid $ 1 for every 100 points you have earned.
Every match proceeds as follows. At the beginning of each match, we randomly divide you into
3-member groups called committees. The committees are completely independent of each other and
payoffs and decisions in one committee have no effect on payoffs and decisions in other committees.
Each member has a single token and can either spend or keep that token. Each member is also
assigned a private token value, which is equally likely to be any amount of points between 1 and 100.
Token value assignments are completely independent across members, across committees, and across
matches. Thus, your own token value tells you absolutely nothing about the token value of the other
members, and has no effect on any future token values that will be assigned to you or anyone else.
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Payoffs are computed as follows. If you keep your token you earn your token value in that match
plus you earn 100 points if both other members of your committee decide to spend their tokens. If
you choose to spend your token, then you earn 100 points if at least one other member of your group
spends their token, and you earn 0 points if no other member of your group spends their token. This
is summarized in the following table.
Insert Table Here
[The following paragraph only in the ‘No Communication’ treatments.] Every match you are
prompted to make your choice to either keep or spend your token. When everyone has made a choice,
the outcome and the choices of the other members of your committee are revealed, and this determines
your earnings for the match.
[The following two paragraphs only in the ‘Binary Communication’ treatments.] Before anyone
makes a spending decision, each of you will have an opportunity to give the other members of your
committee some indication of what your spending decision might be. There are exactly two messages
which you can send. They are:
MESSAGE A: “I INTEND TO SPEND MY TOKEN”
MESSAGE B: “I INTEND TO KEEP MY TOKEN”
Please remember that these are only messages and are not binding in any way. When the message
stage ends, you are told the intent messages of the others in your committee and the decision stage
begins wherein you are prompted to make your choice to either keep or spend your token. This decision
is binding. When everyone has made a choice, the outcome and the choices of the other members of
your committee are revealed, and this determines your earnings for the match.
[The following two paragraphs only in the ‘Token Revelation’ treatments.] Before anyone makes
a spending decision, your committee has a 20 seconds message stage, during which you are allowed to
send a message to the other members of your committee. This message can only be an integer between
1 and 100 and you are allowed to send only one such message. The integer value you send are seen by
both other members of your committee. In the situation where you do not send any message, it will
be shown as a “question mark” to other members of your committee at the end of the message stage.
When the message stage ends, the decision stage begins wherein you are prompted to make your
choice to either keep or spend your token. When everyone has made a choice, the outcome and the
choices of the other members of your committee are revealed, and this determines your earnings for
the match.
[The following two paragraphs only in the ‘Unrestricted Text Chat’ treatments.] Before anyone
makes a spending decision, your committee has a 60 seconds discussion period, during which you are
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allowed to send messages to the other members of your committee. The messages you send are seen by
both other members of your committee. The messages must conform to the following rules: (1) Your
messages must be relevant to the experiment. Do not engage in social chat or use emoticons. (2) You
are not permitted to send messages intended to reveal your identity. (3) The use of threatening or
offensive language, including profanity, is not permitted. (4) Do not send blank or nonsense messages.
When the discussion period ends, the decision stage begins wherein you are prompted to make
your choice to either keep or spend your token. When everyone has made a choice, the outcome and
the choices of the other members of your committee are revealed, and this determines your earnings
for the match.
When all committees have finished the first match, we then go to the next match. You will
be randomly re-matched into new 3-person committees and everyone is independently and randomly
assigned a new token value between 1 and 100. Every match proceeds according to exactly the same
rules as described above.
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C Additional Tables
The following tables expand the analysis presented in the body of the paper, where applicable, to
include data from the early rounds 1-10.
Rounds No Comm. Binary Comm. Token Revelation Unrestricted Chat
C = 1
1-10 113.2 89.7 95.8 176.8**
(15.7) (14.0) (14.8) (11.9)
11-20 88.0 80.2 101.5 221.1***
(15.3) (14.7) (14.6) (7.1)
All rounds 100.6 84.9 98.6 198.9***
(10.9) (10.1) (10.4) (7.2)
C = 1.5
1-10 67.0 82.0 55.1 48.5
(14.0) (13.8) (13.8) (12.4)
11-20 39.6 58.7 42.1 83.4***
(12.4) (13.4) (11.9) (13.9)
All rounds 53.3 70.3 48.6 66.0
(9.4) (9.6) (9.1) (9.4)
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. These significance levels are for one-tailed
Mann-Whitney tests of difference in the net earnings across the communication treatment and ‘No Communication’.
Table 14: Average group earnings net of token values. Standard errors in parentheses.
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Rounds No Comm. Binary Comm. Token Revelation Unrestricted Chat
C = 1
1-10 54.3 (70) 47.5 (80) 48.8 (80) 85.0*** (60)
11-20 42.9 (70) 41.3 (80) 50.0 (80) 98.3*** (60)
All rounds 48.6 (140) 44.4 (160) 49.4 (160) 91.7*** (120)
C = 1.5
1-10 38.8 (80) 43.8 (80) 38.8 (80) 31.3 (80)
11-20 27.5 (80) 37.5 (80) 25.0 (80) 42.5** (80)
All rounds 33.1 (160) 40.6 (160) 31.9 (160) 36.9 (160)
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. These significance levels are for difference in
proportions z-tests in the public good provision across the communication treatment and ‘No Communication’.
Table 15: Frequency of public good provision. Number of observations in parentheses.
Rounds No Comm. Binary Comm. Token Revelation Unrestricted Chat
C = 1
1-10 37.1, 12.9 (70) 36.3, 15.0 (80) 47.5, 6.3* (80) 8.3***, 11.7 (60)
11-20 45.7, 14.3 (70) 41.3, 6.3* (80) 40.0, 11.3 (80) 1.7***, 1.7*** (60)
All rounds 41.4, 13.6 (140) 38.8, 10.6 (160) 43.8, 8.8* (160) 5.0***, 6.7** (120)
C = 1.5
1-10 46.3, 6.3 (80) 30.0**, 6.3 (80) 47.5, 5.0 (80) 45.0, 3.8 (80)
11-20 47.5, 7.5 (80) 38.8, 2.5 (80) 40.0, 7.5 (80) 30.0**, 5.0 (80)
All rounds 46.9, 6.9 (160) 34.4**, 4.4 (160) 43.8, 6.3 (160) 37.5**, 4.4 (160)
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. These significance levels are for difference in
proportions z-tests across the communication treatment and ‘No Communication’.
Table 16: Percentage of wasteful contributions: first entry is for exactly one person contributing and
second entry is for all three members in a group contributing. Number of observations in parentheses.
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Rounds No Comm. Binary Comm. Token Revelation Unrestricted Chat
C = 1
1-10 60.5 (38) 42.1 (38) 61.5 (39) 74.5 (51)
11-20 56.7 (30) 57.6 (33) 65.0 (40) 86.4*** (59)
All rounds 58.8 (68) 49.3 (71) 63.3 (79) 80.9*** (110)
C = 1.5
1-10 64.5 (31) 71.4 (35) 67.7 (31) 80.0 (25)
11-20 68.2 (22) 70.0 (30) 55.0 (20) 79.4 (34)
All rounds 66.0 (53) 70.8 (65) 62.7 (51) 79.7 (59)
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. These significance levels are for difference in
proportions z-tests across the communication treatment and ‘No Communication’.
Table 17: Percentage of two lowest costs contributing. Number of observations where the public good
is provided is in parentheses.
Rounds 1-10 11-20
C = 1
Tokenvalue -0.004* (0.002) -0.005*** (0.002)
Constant 0.73** (0.29) 1.11*** (0.32)
Number of observations 240 240
Pseudo R2 0.033 0.061
C = 1.5
Tokenvalue -0.005*** (0.001) -0.005*** (0.001)
Constant 1.45*** (0.24) 1.62*** (0.28)
Number of observations 240 240
Pseudo R2 0.157 0.148
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
Table 18: Message behavior in the ‘Binary Communication’ treatment: Marginal effects from a probit
regression with “message” as the dependant variable. Standard errors, clustered at the subject level,
are in parentheses.
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mi, Rounds mi = 0, 1-10 mi = 0, 11-20 mi = 1, 1-10 mi = 1, 11-20
C = 1
tokenvaluei -0.01** (0.003) -0.005*** (0.002) -0.01*** (0.002) -0.01*** (0.003)
1{M−i = 1} 0.13 (0.17) -0.01 (0.14) 0.32** (0.15) 0.26* (0.15)
1{M−i = 2} 0.19 (0.23) -0.16 (0.11) 0.02 (0.14) 0.27* (0.16)
Constant 0.37 (0.77) 0.52 (0.66) 1.03*** (0.3) 1.02*** (0.37)
Number of observations 96 80 144 160
Pseudo R2 0.156 0.158 0.267 0.262
C = 1.5
tokenvaluei -0.003*** (0.001) -0.002** (0.001) -0.01*** (0.001) -0.01*** (0.002)
1{M−i = 1} -0.01 (0.04) 0.75*** (0.09) 0.76*** (0.07) 0.46*** (0.14)
1{M−i = 2} -0.02 (0.06) 0.98*** (0.01) 0.60*** (0.12) 0.26** (0.13)
Constant 0.98** (0.4) -5.42*** (0.76) -0.004 (0.36) 0.87** (0.35)
Number of observations 87 80 153 160
Pseudo R2 0.336 0.137 0.439 0.325
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
Table 19: Decision in the ‘Binary Communication’ treatment: Marginal effects from probit regression
with “contribution decision” as the dependant variable. Standard errors, clustered at the subject level,
are in parentheses.
Rounds 1-10 11-20
C = 1
Tokenvalue 0.36** (0.14) 0.35** (0.14)
Constant 23.23*** (7.01) 18.63*** (4.97)
Number of observations 183 198
R2 0.1175 0.1043
C = 1.5
Tokenvalue 0.29** (0.13) 0.38** (0.15)
Constant 34.52*** (7.42) 31.78*** (10.23)
Number of observations 153 150
R2 0.0667 0.1096
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
Table 20: Message behavior in the ‘Token revelation’ treatment: Linear regression with “message” as
the dependant variable. Standard errors, clustered at the subject level, are in parentheses.
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Rounds 1-10 11-20
C = 1
tokenvaluei -0.01*** (0.003) -0.01*** (0.002)
1{tokenvaluei > max{mj}j 6=i} -0.12 (0.11) -0.17** (0.08)
Constant 1.59*** (0.30) 1.78*** (0.21)
Number of observations 183 198
Pseudo R2 0.30 0.31
C = 1.5
tokenvaluei -0.01*** (0.002) -0.02*** (0.003)
1{tokenvaluei > max{mj}j 6=i} -0.17 (0.11) 0.08 (0.17)
Constant 1.98*** (0.47) 1.86*** (0.35)
Number of observations 102 101
Pseudo R2 0.20 0.35
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
Table 21: Decision in the ‘Token revelation’ treatment: Marginal effects from probit regression with
“contribution decision” as the dependant variable. Standard errors, clustered at the subject level, are
in parentheses.
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